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ABSTRACT  When the journal Ethnicities was launched in 2001, the first issue included an article by this author, which examined the politics of ‘race’ and identity as central ingredients in the Rwanda genocide of 1994. This current article considers how political identities have been reconstructed since the genocide, especially from above. History, law and politics are examined, as central instruments in government efforts to construct a new Rwandan society and ensure that genocide will ‘never again’ be possible. Evidence suggests that inequalities in income and land distribution have grown rapidly since 1994. At the same time, the poor and marginalized often find it difficult to openly express their views, including their political identities outside of officially circumscribed spaces and categories. Debates continue around numbers of victims and perpetrators, and new inter-elite conflicts have emerged along language lines. The article shows how race categories have been replaced with new terms, which arise from a particular reading of the genocide. A new foundation myth for Rwanda, a form of diasporic victim nationalism, is also briefly explored. Re-labelling Rwandans from above, the state continues to exercise tight control over the public expression of political identities. Open political debate is very difficult; the government frequently feels it is being attacked, and accuses critics of divisionism or harbouring a genocide mentality. If more inclusive forms of Rwandan-ness are to emerge in future, state controls will need to be relaxed, so that more complex forms of political identities can finally emerge.

KEYWORDS  diasporic ● genocide ● history ● identity ● race

‘race’ has indeed become a fratricidal word. (Montagu, 1953: 85)

Rwandan history is dangerous. (Gourevitch, 1998: 48)

... looking back and forwards at the same time, they are spin-offs of twisted modernity . . . They feel rejected by the world, the state, by the political class . . . ‘identity’ is their last resort. (Doom, 2000: 80)
INTRODUCTION

This article considers the debate on identity and the role of ethnic and racial markers in Rwanda since the genocide of 1994. Citizenship has been reconstructed, but has it become more open and participatory than before the genocide? How has civil society been able to influence state policies? ‘Never again’, so goes the rhetoric of the present government of Rwanda, will outmoded racial and genocidal ideologies haunt the lives of ordinary Rwandans (Rafti, 2004: 6). The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which is the sole party in power, claims its vision as the only enlightened one. Ethnicity has been banned, even gender divisions are said to be gradually disappearing, and Rwandan society is moving into a new era. The regime claims it stands for the very antithesis of the racialized mentality of the past, permanently associated with genocide. Do Rwandans now live in peace, free of the scourge of race hatred, and thanks to their leaders’ foresight and vigilance? Lofty claims like these are made to be questioned, and this article will do just that.

The suggestion in this article is that whilst public expression of political identities has been largely ‘de-racialized’, this has been done in a very top-down and authoritarian manner. The result has prevented the emergence from below of potentially more complex forms of political identification, which could form the basis for more inclusive forms of Rwandan citizenship in future.

Doom (2000), in the quotation at the beginning of this article, suggests that within the ‘twisted’ global modernity that exists today, poor people in marginalized situations may turn to identity politics as one of the few means they have to assert their rights. Although he is thinking of the Mai Mai in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC; formerly, Zaire), Doom’s observation that it is a basic right to be able to define one’s identity ‘from below’, and without coercion, is pertinent to Rwanda. The starting premise of this article is that the identity politics of the poor cannot be equated with the genocidal mobilization of race-based identities. Whereas the latter can be a threat to security, however defined, the former should not be repressed in the name of security and post-genocide nation building.

Creating more inclusive forms of citizenship usually requires some explicit bias on behalf of the most marginalized and socially excluded in society (Kabeer, 2005; Mohanty and Tandon, 2006). Has the government of Rwanda really devoted itself to enabling poor Rwandans to secure their basic livelihoods, and to access their basic economic and social entitlements, as well as protecting their civil and political liberties? Basic rights surely need to be respected by the state before more inclusive and participatory forms of citizenship can start to emerge at the national level. Or can unity and consensus be imposed from above, as the RPF government seems to believe? In principle, whatever is good for ordinary and poor Rwandans
should be central to the government’s priorities in the reconstruction process, if social peace is to result. The RPF regime’s record will be assessed on this basis.

Since ‘open criticism of authority remains a taboo’ for most poor and ordinary people (Jones, 2005: 84), simply asking ordinary Rwandans whether they find it easier to live with one another than in the past, and how they now form their political identities is unlikely to produce reliable results. One cannot expect frank answers to such sensitive questions, yet these are the questions that need to be asked. Researchers who have worked on related issues inside Rwanda in recent years have sometimes found that asking too many probing questions, for example about political identities, may attract the unwanted attention of the Rwandan authorities (McDoom, 2005). Even those sympathetic to the Rwandan regime agree that one must proceed with caution when exploring perspectives that may be critical of the authorities (Jones, 2005: 93; Maina Peter and Kibalama, n.d.). To understand what is happening to Rwandans’ political identities, therefore, other less direct sources of data may be needed, if field work in Rwanda is problematic.³ It is partly for this reason that the profiles of a number of exiled Rwandans are included towards the end of this article. Their stories tend to confirm – at a personal level – much of the evidence contained in available sources, including human rights reports, reflections by non-governmental organization (NGO) workers, journalists, scholars and others. Each testimony draws on a detailed legal case file, and is presented anonymously to protect the individual’s identity. As ‘... opposition has been forced into exile [and] can only exist outside Rwanda’, researchers have followed, and the present researcher is no exception (quote from Rafti, 2004: 8; see, e.g. Eltringham, 2004).

In the second section, we consider some scholarly prognoses for Rwanda, and then reflect in the third section on the main changes in identity politics, before examining post-genocide initiatives for reformulating political identities through history, law and politics in the fourth section. Economic inequalities are then outlined, and debates around numbers reviewed in the next two sections. The labelling of ‘saints’ and ‘sinners’ as it relates to patterns of political identity formation, inclusion and exclusion in Rwanda today is the subject of the next section, which is followed by presentation and analysis of the testimonies of exiles. Some tentative conclusions are drawn in the final section. Throughout, an effort is made to pay: ‘particular attention to the perspectives of the poor and socially excluded’ (Kabeer, 2005: 1), especially the rural poor who still form the vast majority of Rwanda’s population. ‘Ordinary’ Rwandans include the urban poor, impoverished Tutsi survivors, landless people and returnees without resources, but also the: ‘local peasants in the hills ... manipulated by the state to kill their erstwhile neighbours’ during the genocide of 1994 (Karagyesa, 2004). To start with, we consider recent
scholarly prognoses for Rwanda, ranging from the gloomiest to the rather more optimistic.

**TURNING TOWARDS THE FUTURE?**

So what do scholars working on Rwanda ‘from the outside’ think of the past, present and future prognoses for Rwanda? They do not seem to share the sanguine view of the RPF leadership (and of Paul Kagame, in particular). Whereas the regime maintains that its own knowledge and expertise can enable Rwandans to live in peace and prosperity, outside observers are generally less convinced. These predictions concerning Rwanda’s middle-to long-term future vary from those that foresee renewed threats of civil war and genocide to those that raise the prospects of more democratic futures, based on a frank acknowledgement of past mistakes and demilitarization of the wider Great Lakes region. Peaceful, more democratic norms of governance are imagined, more inclusive forms of Rwandan citizenship proposed, yet few scholars today share the overall optimism of the RPF concerning Rwanda’s future. In the list below, the more pessimistic predictions for Rwanda’s future come first, followed by those that at least imagine some kind of positive transformations in the future:

- For someone like the present author, who warned against massive violence during the years leading up to 1994, it is frustrating to wonder whether, in two, five or 10 years from now, the international community, again after the facts, will have to explain why Rwanda has descended into hell once more (Reyntjens, 2004: 210).

- ‘The war [between the RPF and former Rwandan government] . . . crystallised two volatile regional diasporas – one Hutu, the other Tutsi – each determined to set the region on fire if the demands it considered legitimate were not met’ (Mamdani, 2001: 263).

- ‘Arguably ethnic identity is more important today than it was during preparations for the genocide’ (Buckley-Zistel, 2004).

- ‘Without a vision of the past which acknowledges that different interpretations of history will exist, Rwanda . . . and the Great Lakes region generally, will remain entrapped in an official discourse which legitimizes the use of violence and makes some, leaders and led, génocidaires’ (Pottier, 2002: 207).

- ‘. . . a critique of colonialism and its effects on people’s categories of perception was never allowed to develop and mature in Rwanda. Although this critique is not the only measure needed in order to bring about reconciliation in Rwanda, Rwandans must start here.'
They must acknowledge, then question, then criticize the enduring effects that colonialism has had on their own minds’ (Taylor, 1999: 177).

● ‘For the Congo, as for Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda [a political solution] ... implies the resolution of the crises of democratic transition by putting an end to governments established by the force of arms, and embarking on a path of genuine national reconciliation, justice and inclusiveness’ (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2003: 264).

It is notable that some of the more gloomy prognoses above are from ‘seasoned scholars’, not Rwandans themselves, who have worked on the Great Lakes region for years, sometimes decades. Among the somewhat more optimistic, we see the importance of history, of more inclusive forms of citizenship and of an approach that can transform the wider Great Lakes region as well as Rwanda itself. Immediately following the genocide, the RPF was given the benefit of the doubt by many scholars, journalists and human rights organizations. The present author was no exception, and was later criticized for naivety (Hintjens, 1999; Pottier, 2002: 121 and 123). Disillusion set in soon after the end of the genocide, both among seasoned Great Lakes observers and relative newcomers to the subject, with growing evidence of coercive policies, including military and economic intervention in the DRC, forced return of refugees, village resettlement schemes, and harsh treatment of the political opposition inside and outside Rwanda. Almost anyone could be accused of divisionism and harbouring a genocide mentality. Some journalists previously sympathetic to the RPF came into conflict with it once they became less complimentary; some were denied visas, others found themselves unwelcome in Rwanda (Gerard Prunier and Alison des Forges are two examples). As Doom puts it: ‘Working in the Great Lakes region can be quite instructive for [anyone] ... devoted to objective research’ (Doom, 2000: 83). Accumulated expertise on the Great Lakes region does not impress the Rwandan government; after decades of research, some scholars are no longer able to conduct primary research in Rwanda (Reyntjens is one, but he is not alone). In the next section, the murkiness of identity politics in Rwanda is explored, and some points made that are substantiated in detail later in the article.

THE OUTLINES OF THE PROBLEM: THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS

The Rwandan government, dominated by Paul Kagame and the RPF, presents itself as a bulwark against the forces of genocide, including tribalism, ethnicity and race ideology (Rafti, 2004). Under the Organic Law of
2003, a new set of thought and speech crimes were introduced into the law, including ‘divisionism’, ‘ethnic ideology’ and a ‘genocide mentality’. All are seen as atavistic and backward looking, and ethnicity in any case has been delegitimized (and is illegal) as a means of public political expression or identification. Rwanda’s present rulers see themselves as steering the country towards an enlightened, progressive future free of colonial and racial mental maps. They also point to progress made in physical reconstruction, infrastructure, criminal justice and re-education of the population.

Unfortunately, not everyone sees things as the regime would like them to. Even those who simply show that not everyone is benefiting equally from Rwanda’s economic and political ‘progress’ can run the risk of being accused of divisionism (Jones, 2005). Human rights NGOs, donors, ordinary individuals, politicians and former allies can find themselves declared enemies of the new Rwanda. Political opposition and criticism has been criminalized, and for stating their beliefs about the government, Rwandans can now be imprisoned, disappear, be forced into exile, or killed (Front Line, 2005). This is explored in more detail later.

Giving the RPF the benefit of the doubt is important. This is in spite of growing evidence of RPF involvement in war crimes, along with its military wing the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), of Rwandan government and army pillage in the DRC, and of human rights abuses in the country, especially the trend for killing, arresting and disappearing enemies at home (Front Line, 2005; Hintjens, 2006; Human Rights Watch, 2005). But when controversial French Judge Bruguiere recently claimed RPF leaders had shot down President Habyarimana’s plane on 6 April 1994, providing the spark that set off the genocide, this was an accusation too far. Independent sources such as Human Rights Watch refuted the findings as ‘political’. So did the Kigali authorities. However, in accusing the judge of ‘negationism’ and genocide denial, and in claiming that the judge’s witnesses were: ‘... wanted persons in Rwanda’s criminal circles and opposition groups’ (Embassy of Rwanda, 2007), the government also showed its repressive tendencies. It would be fair to say that on the question of who shot down the President’s plane, the jury is still out and evidence is inconclusive (though see Chossudovsky, 2003 and Reyntjens, 1995a; and Melvern, 2006 for two very different conspiracy theories).

Rwanda’s political leaders post-1994 distinguish themselves by their political acumen in relation to their Anglo-Saxon partners. They have astutely cultivated close diplomatic, aid and even intelligence relations with the US and UK, speaking excellent English, appearing honest and business-minded, and being suitably assertive with their partners, thus gaining their grudging respect. Kagame, in particular, has an excellent feel for what will work in the capitals of the English-speaking heartlands. The proclivities of western diplomatic and political circles being what they are, they do not object to being taken to task for their failures during the genocide in
Rwanda in 1994, as long as they can assuage their guilt through development aid or other forms of assistance (including military cooperation). Sometimes in aid relations, nibbling the hand that feeds you is not a bad idea. During the first few years after the genocide, some donors supported reconciliation and reconstruction quite generously, including the Netherlands, UK and USA. Village resettlement schemes were funded that would normally have been vetoed, were it not for donors’ awareness of the sensitivity of the post-genocide security situation (Verwimp, 2003). Human Rights Watch defined the problem in the following way:

Burdened by guilt over their inaction during the genocide . . . they generously support the Rwandan government – credited with having ended the genocide – while ordinarily overlooking its human rights abuses. (Human Rights Watch, 2005)

Thus, the US and UK governments took years to recognize, let alone condemn RPF atrocities in neighbouring DRC, implicitly accepting the Rwandan government’s argument that its presence across the borders was for self-defence. Repression at home, including the banning of the main opposition party, the MDR, and hounding of Rwandan NGOs, journalists and politicians has not caused much more concern than military adventurism in the DRC (Front Line, 2005).

An important factor in the regime’s continuing prestige in some circles is its use of the media, and its cultivation of good diplomatic relations with key partners. For a long time, the RPF was able to cultivate an image, especially in the anglophone world, of a brave, overpopulated little country, battling its genocidal legacies, trying to grapple with lawless killers across the border, whilst fighting backwardness and poverty at home. With help from its donors, so goes this story, the government was helping ordinary Rwandans come to terms with their past, taste justice and move forward into a new Rwanda. The regime tries to convince donors that only a strong government can protect Rwandans against the ongoing threat of genocide (Front Line, 2005: 98–102; Human Rights Watch, 2005). Kagame and the RPF present themselves as fighting an invisible enemy, which means that people’s attitudes towards race and ethnicity must be policed – and some civil and political right sacrificed – if genocide is not to recur. The Rwandan government claims its absolute priority is ‘never again’ (Rafti, 2004: 6).

The problem is that the regime monopolizes political correctness (Pottier, 2000). Since only the RPF can police divisionism, it follows that only the RPF can deliver real security for ordinary Rwandans in future. They should therefore trust the government, and non-Rwandans should not interfere. According to Human Rights Watch, ‘the Rwandan government has created a veneer of stability by suppressing dissent and limiting the exercise of civil and political rights. It often cites the need to avoid another
genocide as the purported justification for such repressive measures’ (Human Rights Watch, 2005).

The RPF rejects any comparisons between the crimes of the 1994 genocide and its own war crimes and killings of civilians during the war of 1990 to 1994, as well as thereafter. Instead, the uniqueness of the 1994 genocide is asserted, and the government thus avoids facing up to its own role in atrocities against civilians from 1990 onwards. Any parallels drawn between the organized mass killings of Hutus in Burundi in 1972 and the genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994 is also vehemently rejected as inappropriate. Yet both have been recognized as genocides (Eltringham, 2004; Novick, 2001: 188–201; Reyntjens, 1995b). The uniqueness argument is offensive to those who lost relatives or suffered injury at the hands of the RPF; more importantly, it is itself a form of denial.5

Game playing with donors during discussions over Rwanda’s human rights record can be similarly manipulative. When the RPF government was reminded that those accused of divisionism or a genocide mentality should be presumed innocent until proven guilty, the reply from Kagame was dismissive:

... genocide and divisionism are not Kinyarwanda words, and I don’t know what it means in their [i.e. European Union] context. I suggest that they explain it themselves. What we should be asked is whether what we are doing for this country is good or not, and we will be ready to explain this. (Kagame, 2004)

The point may be fair, but a willingness to take criticism is the sign of an open attitude, and something that is lacking on the part of this regime. Thus, for instance, to be able to work in Rwanda, NGOs and other organizations need to engage in ‘quiet diplomacy’, behind the scenes, if they are to avoid accusations and risks. Organizations such as CARE and even USAID have had to tread lightly in Rwanda and avoid any confrontation with the RPF. As Jones sees the Rwandan context: ‘In this day and age, the government is not receptive to anything other than a low-profile, collaborative approach’ (Jones, 2005: 98). Any open criticism by embassies, donors or NGOs places Rwandan staff in these organizations at particular risk, as well as jeopardizing the agency’s capacity to operate effectively inside Rwanda (Front Line, 2005: 103).

A recent study identified Rwandan NGOs as lacking in mutual solidarity, something that can pose problems in ensuring their collective independent voice vis-à-vis government. When one considers that the dominant emotional tone in public life tends to be one of fear and distrust, this finding is not that surprising (Maina Peter and Kibalama, n.d.). The report included some discussion of ethnic and race labels, which were still used occasionally, mostly in anger or in confessional mode, and generally in private settings. Terms such as Hutu, Tutsi and Twa can only be used in public if it is to dismiss them and deny their salience. Since the RPF took over power
and refugees returned from throughout the Great Lakes region and beyond, some new linguistic and political divisions have cut across the formerly dominant ethnic identities of Rwandans, who are now divided (at least at elite level) between the anglophones and the francophones. The trouble is that:

Though seemingly subtle, these differences could have implications not only for intra-civil society relations; [for] civil society-government-donor relations in general, but also for the unity of Rwandan society as a whole (Maina Peter and Kibalama, n.d.: 66).

The francophone population is itself divided between those who returned to post-genocide Rwanda after many decades outside the country, those who never fled but were invited to come to Rwanda as part of a wider diaspora, and new caseload returnees who managed to survive and came back, but often found their land squatted by old caseload returnees. The early post-genocide diasporic return policies of the RPF were reversed by 2000 or so, causing chaos and hostility towards those courted by Rwanda, especially the Banyamulenge in Eastern DRC (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002). Banyamulenge were recruited into the Rwandan army and paramilitary forces, especially in DRC, where they served as cannon-fodder. Later they were literally abandoned, and even denied Rwandan citizenship (see profile of exile Case 3 later).

Rwandan society has become much more complex since the genocide, with four rather than two languages in current use; to French and Kinyarwanda have been added English and Kiswahili, both more widely used today. Both English and French feature on the government’s official website, and are used for legal and administrative documents (des Forges, 2005). It is impossible, in any dealings with Rwandan officials, diplomats, bureaucrats or NGO workers, not to notice the increasing dominance of the anglophone ‘Ugandans’ (Hintjens and Kiwuwa, 2006; Rafti, 2004). This small group virtually monopolizes the top echelons of the government ministries and of the military. This dominance is resented by skilled francophone Rwandans, squeezed into the professions and business, and generally not as successful as their anglophone compatriots. Many ‘poor and ordinary’ Rwandans, of course, speak neither French nor English. Since the anglophone Ugandans did not grow up in Rwanda, and some did not even speak fluent Kinyarwanda when they returned to the country, it is likely that they are viewed as even more remote from the realities of daily life for the rural poor than their predecessors.

It is no longer acceptable to refer to people publicly as Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, since these terms are officially proscribed, but other ways of speaking about ethnic identity have been found, and have in fact been provided by the government in its own official categories for Rwandans. Another form of political identification, widely used though not sanctioned by the
government, is racial, where the terms ‘bantu’ and ‘hamite’ are used. Use of these terms is a growing trend in the Great Lakes region and beyond (Hintjens and Masemola, 2004).

Inside Rwanda today, the only officially sanctioned categories of social and political identification, used in legal and administrative documents and in public discourse, are derived from the official reading of the genocide and related refugee movements. The main categories are: (1) survivors; (2) old caseload returnees; (3) new caseload returnees; (4) suspected génocidaires. In practice these overlap, especially (3) and (4). Debates on how many Rwandans fit into these various categories are covered in the next section. A tiny minority of the population (1%) are Twa and could fit into any and all of these categories, or none at all. They remain a largely invisible minority in Rwanda, although many were also killed during the genocide.

One could be forgiven for imagining that what mattered in Rwanda were ethnic and race labels; sometimes history is presented as if this were the case. In fact, in addition to the Hutu–Tutsi divide, which so dominated politics during the early 1990s in particular, there were sharp sociopolitical class and regional divisions among others. These were always salient divisions for Rwandans, but were largely brushed under the carpet by the dominant ethnic politics (Gasana et al., 1999). As officially sanctioned categories of survivor, suspected génocidaires, and new and old caseload returnees have come into widespread usage, rural–urban differences, class conflict, regional tensions and the anglophone–francophone divide all tend to be swept under the carpet. The question addressed in the next section is how policies of the post-genocide regime have affected ordinary Rwandans since 1994 in terms of their political identity choices and citizenship rights.

UNITY, PROGRESS AND PEACE?

In the search for unity and reconciliation, the Rwandan government’s main instruments have been history, law and politics. This section deals with each of these in turn before we examine changing economic and social conditions in Rwanda in the section that follows, focusing on the impact on the Rwandan poor.

History

Debates about Rwandan colonial and pre-colonial history will not be rehearsed here, nor will the events of the genocide, since this has been done elsewhere (for a classic history, see Lemarchand, 1970; also Eltringham, 2004; Hintjens, 1999; Mamdani, 2001; Pottier, 2002). As Gourevitch asserts in his quotation used at the start of this article, ‘Rwandan history is
dangerous’, and recent studies confirm this, showing how Rwandans’ own versions of history, and key events recounted, vary depending on their prior positioning in relation to recent history, the genocide and those in power in Rwanda today (Eltringham, 2004). Eltringham’s study both draws on and tends to confirm the findings of Lisa Malkki’s study of the historical narratives of Burundian refugees in Tanzania during the early 1990s (Malkki, 1995).

For the current regime, only one account of Rwandan history is acceptable, which is that all was well among Rwandans until the colonizers created pseudo-racial, later ethnic identities, in order to quite deliberately divide Rwandans against one another (van Hoyweghen and Vlassenroot, 2000: 98–100). For the RPF, the evils of genocide can be traced back directly to these European colonial divide-and-rule strategies and the racial ideology they imported (Hintjens, 2001; Hintjens and Masemola, 2004). This view of Rwandan history explains why the RPF wants to remove ethnic and race markers from politics altogether. They are viewed as incompatible with modernity and decolonization. The Government of Rwanda official website includes a section entitled ‘History’ that describes the ‘symbiotic’ quality of social relations in pre-colonial Rwandan society, positing more or less complete pre-colonial unity between Tutsi, Hutu and Twa (Government of Rwanda, n.d.).

Most researchers reject this notion, but most also agree that the dominance of one social group over another – which pre-existed the arrival of Europeans in Rwanda – was greatly rigidified by colonial rule. In his widely cited study of the causes of the 1994 genocide, Mamdani suggests pre-colonial ethnic or caste divisions in Rwanda already existed and that Belgian colonial administrative arrangements greatly intensified inequalities and exacerbated differences between social groups, now defined in race terms for the first time (Mamdani, 2001: 70). This seems more realistic than the Rwandan Garden of Eden wrecked by the colonizers. Mamdani and others go further and suggest that ethnic mobilization can be the precursor for nationalism, and can be anti-colonial rather than racial and backward-looking (Mamdani, 1996). For the RPF, the diaspora of 2 million Rwandan refugees played a critical role, after all, in helping restore some semblance of harmony and unity in Rwanda. The official understanding is that the diaspora’s return from exile began on 1 October 1990, when the RPA launched an armed attack from Uganda, starting a ‘war of liberation against the military dictatorship in Kigali’ (Government of Rwanda, n.d.). Suddenly the role of the diaspora became critical to restoring a Rwandan sense of national identity over and above the racial-cum-ethnic labels inherited from the past.

Political leaders always reinterpret history so that they cast themselves in a more positive light, or make their job of managing others more manageable. The Hutu power ideology, during the early 1990s, repeatedly raised the
spectre of Tutsi dominance, as refugees returned, not to liberate Rwandans but to enslave them through force of arms and to reinstall the monarchy (Eltringham, 2004). Ironically, in 1997, a monarchist movement did develop, centred on the family of the former mwami or king, Kigeri V, calling for the monarchy to be restored, with full powers. ‘The bi-ethnic support of the monarchist movement alarmed the RPF’, because ‘. . . talk of monarchy is “profane” in Rwanda’ (Rafti, 2004: 15). Many Hutu farmers who collaborated with genocidal forces that took over the country after 6 April 1994 either faced, or believed they faced, the choice between kill or be killed (Lyons and Straus, 2006). A few brave souls tried to maintain law and order during the genocide; some refused to engage in genocidal killings, but few of those survived, and even fewer were recognized. Some of those who refused to participate were even hounded and killed after the genocide, having been mistaken for genocidaires by the RPF (Cruvellier et al., 2004; Lyons and Straus, 2006).

Events in neighbouring Burundi have long had powerful ‘ricochet’ effects across the border in Rwanda through ‘mirror image’ flows of refugees and in the contrasting political composition, from the early 1960s until 1994, of elites and the army (Hintjens, 1999; Lemarchand, 1996). The RPF view of history shows little awareness of this connection, however, and instead views Rwandan history since independence up to 1994 as a series of persecutions of Tutsi. This narrow interpretation of the past fails to acknowledge that not all Hutu benefited under the first two post-independence Hutu-dominated regimes. The spectre of eternal Tutsi victimhood does not help in opening up more complex and inclusive forms of political identity for all Rwandans.

**Law**

After history, law is the second instrument of post-genocide reconstruction. Shortly after the end of the genocide, the new government removed the terms Hutu, Tutsi and Twa from Rwandan identity cards. Major legal changes were introduced in 2003, with a new Constitution and the Organic Law of 2003 marking the end of the transitional regime, and the start of the new Rwanda under the RPF and President Kagame. The terms Hutu, Tutsi and Twa were banned in public discourse, and driven into the realm of private spaces. Only an officially sanctioned reading of the genocide was permissible in public; other versions were to be for private, informal spaces only. The refashioning of Rwandan political identities was to be carried out by various institutions, including a fund for survivors, a National Unity and Reconciliation Commission and a National Human Rights Commission. So-called solidarity camps were to re-educate Rwandans about their past; but perhaps the most noteworthy legal innovation has been the gacaca hearings, neo-traditional, open-air commune-level meetings that hear less
serious crimes of genocide (Corey and Joireman, 2004). *Gacaca* have been the subject of a great deal of scholarly, legal and media attention, as an experiment in post-conflict justice with some ‘traditional’ elements of restorative justice (Daly, 2002; Schabas, 2005).\(^6\) For some, *gacaca* offers the prospect of combining restorative justice with retributive justice for lesser crimes of genocide. So far, tens of thousands of suspects have been released from prison to face justice in the local *gacaca* hearings; most passed through solidarity camps on the way back to their own communities (Clark, 2005; Carlin, 2003).

However, justice for the accused in *gacaca* is a haphazard affair. Without any defence for the accused, serious miscarriages of justice can result; as with the formal court system, innocent people can be imprisoned, for instance, for having witnessed RPA war crimes, or for being involved in a land dispute (for a disturbing example of the former, see Lyons and Straus, 2006: 50–58; on the latter see Pottier, 2000). *Gacaca* is only for crimes of genocide in 1994, and the Rwandan government has: ‘stated repeatedly that . . . these courts may not hear accusations of such crimes by soldiers of the RDF [Rwandan Defense Force; the successor of the RPA], which must be taken to regular courts, a position that continued to be questioned’ by many Rwandans and outside observers (Human Rights Watch, 2005). The contribution of *gacaca* to reconciliation and national unity is thus not self-evident; dangers of retribution and false accusations are real enough; witnesses and suspected *genocidaires*, as well as their relatives, have already been attacked and even killed. At best, promoting post-conflict justice through *gacaca* is a gamble that may occasionally result in healing. One observer of the process noted the tendency for ‘two sides’ to distance themselves physically from one another over time, as social groups placed themselves on opposite sides of the proceedings, physically as well as ideologically remote (Clark, 2005). Dividing lines between Rwandans are, of course, difficult to heal, given the recent past. There also remain attitudes in place that exacerbate cleavages, combining: ‘Hierarchical leadership, passive acceptance of the status quo and a culture of silence, rumours and mistrust’, none of which helps to promote either a sense of shared citizenship or even trust, let alone reconciliation (Jones, 2005: 95). Critics accuse the present government of using the law as an instrument to protect and promote the interests of a tiny, interconnected and mostly anglophone political elite (Pottier, 2002; Rafti, 2004; Reyntjens, 2004).

**Politics**

The third instrument is politics itself, including through legal reforms. The goal of the regime in this respect seems to be, above all, to remain in power and to disable its opponents and critics. The regime’s relentless efforts to suppress all mention of ‘race’ and ethnicity have led to some
counter-productive measures. The Organic Law introduced in 2003 allowed political parties to be registered, but only if they could ‘... reflect the unity of Rwandan people’, which begged the question of which unity was being referred to. Under the same law, all political parties were ‘prohibited from disseminating information (of) a denigrating or divisive nature’ about elected and appointed political leaders, and were forbidden from using ‘words and acts that intend to denigrate or disparage a person in order to unlawfully remove him or her from leadership positions’ (Articles 20, 40.10). This was mixed up with the crime of ‘Negationism or trivialization of genocide’, prohibited under Article 40.14 of the same law, and ‘betraying other politicians and the country’ under Article 41.4. This hotchpotch of political correctness and political convenience highlights how law and politics merge, and are designed in combination to prevent open criticism of the current regime.

Following the presidential elections of August 2003, the impression has been formed that the RPF government enjoys relatively high legitimacy and support among ordinary Rwandans. Kagame obtained 95 percent of the vote. On the other hand, all viable opposition had been eliminated, through house arrests, false accusations of divisionism and so forth. The vote for Kagame in the presidential elections was not surprising given his complete stranglehold over the levers of state authority, and the widespread intimidation of opponents (Carlin, 2003).

Far from supporting the regime, most Rwandans fear it; the political climate has deteriorated, with assassinations and disappearances of opposition politicians increasing since 2003. Prominent personalities have been abducted and killed. One, Augustin Cyiza, a human rights campaigner, former judge and former senior member of the army, disappeared in April 2003. According to several reports, he was abducted by the army (Cruvelier et al., 2004; Front Line, 2005). However, the government claimed he fled to Uganda, and then joined what was left of the Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR) in Congo, thus accusing one of its longest-standing critics, a former ally, of wanting to ‘finish off the genocide’, an unlikely story (Cruvelier et al., 2004: 204). Cyiza had experienced threats and a strong sense of menace before his abduction; something that also comes across in the accounts of individual exiles, presented towards the end of this article.

Almost anyone can find themselves an enemy of the regime; those critical of RPF military and economic manoeuvres in DRC, those who uncover the diversion of funds, or those who feel genocide survivors are not being compensated properly (Reyntjens, 2004). The treatment of political opponents has hardened if anything in recent years, and even prominent Tutsi survivors, such as Assiel Kabera, have been gunned down – in his case in 2000 in the middle of Kigali (Human Rights Watch, 2000). Opposition politicians in Rwanda have been subjected to house arrest and show trials. The main opposition party, Le Mouvement Démocratique Républicaine
(MDR), remains banned, removing the need for overt fraud at election times. The most vociferous critics of the RPF are often those who previously worked closely with Kagame; the former Prime Minister, a Hutu, accused the RPF leadership of racism against himself and the Hutu majority (Bizimungu, 2001). Unfortunately, the National Human Rights Commission, created under the new Constitution of 2003, has proven compliant, going along with the strategy of criminalizing Kagame’s political opponents. Embassies have even been requested to provide lists of names of Rwandan asylum seekers, which it claims are criminals on the run (Cruvelier, 2004: 195). The evidence available points to a pattern of extrajudicial killings by the Kigali authorities, both inside the country and in neighbouring countries, including Kenya and the DRC (Cruvelier et al, 2004; Front Line, 2005; Human Rights Watch, 2000).

In 2004, a major purge of judges, mayors, officials and teachers passed almost unnoticed outside of Rwanda, except in human rights circles (Human Rights Watch, 2005). The staff of Rwanda’s main independent human rights organization, League for the Protection of Human Rights in Rwanda (Liprodhor) fled Rwanda, having been accused publicly of divisionism, its assets frozen. The Intelligence Services play a critical role in monitoring and discrediting the regime’s opponents. Not surprisingly, most Rwandans are afraid to vote for any but the ruling RPF party (Dorsey, 2000; Front Line, 2005; Reyntjens, 2004). What goes on behind the scenes tends to set the political agenda; debates in the media are like the part of the iceberg visible above water (Dorsey, 2000; Rafti, 2004). Given that anyone regarded as hostile by the present government can disappear, they are usually well advised to leave Rwanda. So much so, that since 2003: ‘the flight of Hutu and Tutsi public figures has transferred the opposition from the Rwandan interior into exile’ (Rafti, 2004: 5).

**SHIFTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS**

Identity politics does not take place in a vacuum, and a critical challenge for the prospects for more democratic forms of politics in Rwanda is an improvement in the situation of ‘ordinary and poor’ Rwandans. This section has an explicit focus on the position of the poorest and most vulnerable.

Superficially, Rwanda seems peaceful, secure and prosperous, and much has improved in terms of the appearance of the urban environment, in particular since 1994. If one visited the capital city, Kigali, and perhaps Virunga National Park, one would leave with an impression of an orderly, calm country that is doing quite well, in an undemonstrative kind of way. But appearances are certainly deceptive in this respect. The dominant feature of economic development in Rwanda since 1998 has been a shift
from reliance on agricultural production based on staples such as tea and coffee to an economy and public sector increasingly reliant on cross-border 'rent-seeking' economic activities, especially in the DRC, and development aid (Eltringham and van Hoyweghen, 2000). To this extent, the real foundations of wealth have shifted since the genocide, and this may mean that efforts to tackle chronic and worsening rural poverty have become less urgent for those in power, who depend on a much more extraverted pattern of resources accumulation than their predecessors (Relief Web, 2003; United Nations, 2002).

In economic terms, Rwanda has become a 'basket case' of development (De Rivero, 2001). The few new jobs created are in urban areas, where more and more impoverished and landless Rwandans try to eke out their livelihoods (Verwimp, 2003; Walker, 2004). A draft report for the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) produced by staff of IDS and ODI in the UK has concluded that whilst poverty was slightly reduced by high annual growth rates of around 8 percent between 1995 and 2000, during the period of physical and institutional reconstruction, the benefits of this growth 'appeared to bypass most rural areas' (Evans et al., 2005: 15). The same researchers estimated that between 2000 and 2004, per capita incomes dropped from US$260 to US$220 (Evans et al., 2005: 15). 'Food and asset vulnerabilities remain widespread in rural areas, with some regions subject to continuous food shortages' (Evans et al., 2005: 15). The same document shows, in Annex 1, that the population living below the poverty line in Rwanda was to be reduced from 60 to 30 percent by 2015, a wildly unrealistic target in the circumstances (Evans et al., 2005: 81).

Statistical indicators are always hard to interpret, but most indicators suggest Rwanda is now more class divided and polarized than ever before. The Gini coefficient, a recognized indicator of income distribution, rose from 0.27 in 1985 to 0.46 by 1999–2000 (Evans et al., 2005: 15), a remarkably rapid increase. In 2001, an estimated 60 percent of Rwandan households had plots of less than half a hectare, barely enough to sustain a household (Huggins and Musahara, 2004: 2). Seeming to ignore the evidence that resettlement schemes rarely work, and that smaller farms, using many micro-plots, can be more productive, the Rwandan government introduced a new Land law in 2005 (Musahara and Huggins, 2004: 3; Jose, 2004). This law starts from the false premise that in the Rwandan context, larger-scale farms would be more efficient than small family-farmed plots. Distress sales of land, and land scarcity within large families, mean that many rural poor now need food aid simply in order to survive. Yet the land law recognizes only those landless families classified as 'old caseload' returnees. In other words, those who returned from the Rwandan, mainly Tutsi, diaspora after years abroad in Uganda, Burundi and elsewhere (Musahara and Huggins, 2004: 3). The ‘... rational nature
of... diversified cropping patterns’, is denied, and the five to 10 plots, spread around over different kinds of land and topography, which most farmers cultivate, are to be consolidated under the new law (Musahara and Huggins, 2004: 3).

Determined to concentrate land-holdings and ‘modernize’ agriculture through intensification, the regime shows a certain indifference for the expertise and knowledge of Rwanda’s mostly very poor and small-scale farmers. The social distance between urban elites and small-scale peasant producers is probably greater than before the genocide. Landless rural families live in extreme poverty, with recurring food shortages now affecting some regions. Many of the poor lack even basic access to health care and education. The problem of small-scale producers in Rwanda is not a Malthusian one, however, as some would have us believe (Andre and Platteau, 1998). It is the outcome of elite land-grabbing, which has allowed a few people to amass huge holdings, including the lion’s share of good quality arable land. Small producers still make up the vast majority of Rwanda’s people, but are by-passed in the quest for modernization. The government of Rwanda presents its land reform proposals as if modernization is unavoidable, and implies a shift towards more ‘productive’, larger-scale agricultural production units. Some donors seem ready to agree (Mosley, 2004). As in the past, it seems the combination of high aid dependency and authoritarian governmental style serves to perpetuate structural violence in Rwandan social relations (Maina Peter and Kibalama, n.d.; Uvin, 1998).

But in many rural areas, violence has been more than structural. There has been force used, especially in the north-west, to oblige new caseload returnees in particular, to move into villages, causing a security situation that Rafti describes as: ‘armed peace’, an apt description of the besieged state of many ordinary and poor Rwandans (Rafti, 2004). Conflicts pit very small producers against larger land-owning farmers with better access to markets, credit and inputs. The peasantry with their machetes and ‘weeding’ practices were once the heroes of the Kigali authorities; now they seem irreversibly associated with the genocide in the mind of the political, military and economic elite that runs Rwanda. Their very poverty is treated as a barrier to progress and modernity rather than a cause for concern.

A possible clue as to why the government’s attitude towards the rural poor may be so dismissive lies in an emerging war over numbers, centring on who died, who took part in the genocide, and is therefore legitimately a victim or a suspect, a survivor or a possible genocidaire. The following section considers these debates.
DEBATING NUMBERS

Time does not seem the great healer it is generally thought to be in the Rwandan context. On the contrary, during the first decade after the 1994 genocide, the classification of victims and perpetrators has evolved so as to include fewer and fewer victims and survivors and to point at more and more potentially or actually culpable perpetrators. There have been continuous re-readings of the genocide and the outcome seems more likely to further social and inter-group polarization than reconciliation and social peace. A visiting journalist noted that the first genocide commemorations in 1995 had been a genuine exercise in collective mourning for all Rwandans, but by 2004, the frank recollection of the events of the genocide had been overtaken by an officially elaborated rhetoric, an officially sanctioned version of the genocide (Remy, 2004). This story of the genocide is hegemonic in the sense that it defines who should be considered ‘true’ victims and villains of the genocide, and ultimately transmits the meaning of the genocide for the present.

When new caseload refugees started to return to Rwanda from 1996 onwards, they faced suspicions of active or at least passive involvement in the 1994 genocide of Tutsi. With time, instead of becoming more circumscribed, what is worrying is that the circle of the guilty seems to have grown. Mamdani observed this at first hand:

Every time I visited post-genocide Rwanda, I would ask responsible state officials . . . how many ordinary civilians they thought had participated in the genocide. Every time the answer was in the millions. Even more troubling, the estimate grew with each visit (Mamdani, 2001: 266).

The highest academic estimate calculates that 10 percent of Rwandan Hutu took an active part in the genocide in 1994, representing around 350,000–600,000 people (Lemarchand, reported in Eltringham, 2004: 69). In mid-2003, The East African reported that 571,934 suspected genocidaires were held on the computer database of Rwanda’s then-Prosecutor General Gerald Gahima (Martin, 2003). In line with this, Human Rights Watch reported that the Prosecutor General had estimated that up to 500,000 people would eventually be tried in gacaca courts (Human Rights Watch, 2005; Martin, 2003).

But more recently much higher estimates have appeared that seem designed to divide Rwandans along ‘race’ or ‘ethnic’ lines once more. In 1999, Paul Kagame reportedly claimed the true figure of genocide suspects was close to one million, the Rwandan ambassador to Belgium later giving a figure of two million, equivalent to the entire adult male Hutu population of Rwanda at the time (Eltringham, 2004: 70). Finally, at a major conference held at the University of Oxford, UK, in May 2004, the then Deputy Prosecutor for Rwanda, General Martin Ngoga, referring to gacaca, showed
the same irresponsible attitude, claiming that ‘[e]ven if we find three quarters of the population guilty of genocide, it is not a problem’ (Ngoga, 2004). At the same time, acquittals of those accused of crimes of genocide in Rwandan courts increased from 9 percent in 1997 to almost 25 percent by 2002 (Liprodhor in Amnesty International, 2002). The circle of genocide suspects has widened, in part, thanks to the gacaca plea-bargaining system; naming others and confessing one’s own guilt are ways of reducing or commuting one’s own sentence (Clark, 2005: 14–15).

The question of who died during the war and during the genocide of 1994 is linked to questions of commemoration. As corpses were unearthed in Rwanda after 1994, Hutu claimed their relatives were buried alongside the remains of acknowledged Tutsi victims of the genocide in the same mass graves (Pottier, 2002: 160–4). They wanted their relatives recognized as victims of genocide and civil war. Yet officially the position is that ‘moderate Hutu’, as they are officially referred to, were mostly killed during the genocide; those who were not are not survivors – they are just lucky. Their contribution in some cases to resisting genocide remains largely unacknowledged, outside some well known political leaders and human rights activists (Walsh, 2004). Yet evidence of mass killings of Hutus during the genocide for refusing to collaborate, or later by the RPA for supposedly having collaborated, is available in personal accounts as well as large-scale studies (for personal accounts, see Lyons and Straus, 2006). The highest estimate (Davenport and Armstrong, 2004) of around half a million Hutu murdered during the genocide seems on the high side, but the RPF estimate of 60,000 ‘moderate Hutu’ killed during the genocide is almost certainly an underestimate (Reuters, 3 April 2004; University of Maryland, 2004). The RPF estimate is that just 6 percent of those killed during the genocide period and civil war from April to July 1994 were Hutu (Reyntjens, 2004: 178). One expert has proposed that since around one million Tutsis lived in Rwanda before 1994, and only around 200,000 or so survived, it follows that around 800,000 victims of the genocide were Tutsi, leaving around 200,000 Hutu victims (Reyntjens, 2004: 178). In other words, of the victims of genocide, some 800,000 were killed because they were identified as enemies along ‘racial’ lines, and around 200,000 more were victims of genocide, selected for political rather than ‘racial’ reasons, but nonetheless politically identified for slaughter. Precise numbers cannot be known for certain (Eltringham, 2004: Ch. 3; Kakwenzire and Kamukama, 1999: 64).

Hutu killed or injured because they refused to kill Tutsi, refused to use a gun, sought not to inform or tried to protect Tutsis, should be considered victims of genocide, or survivors. Their deaths should be investigated, and their killers brought to justice. The victims of genocide should not be defined in racial terms; selecting people on this basis gives objective value to the fiction of race. In recognizing only Tutsi victims and survivors, the RPF regime claims the race ideology as its own, implicitly. In this context,
the term ‘Holocaust’, which originally referred to all those killed by Nazis, only later came to refer exclusively to Jewish victims of Nazi killings, excluding Roma, Ukrainians, Poles, communists, homosexuals or those considered mentally or physically ‘unfit’ (Novick, 2001: 20–22).

We now consider the implications of the regime’s emerging gallery of goodies and baddies, sinners and saints, for citizenship.

**OF SAINTS, SINNERS AND CITIZENSHIP**

Narrowing down who is a victim, who a survivor, and broadening out the scope of who can be considered a potential perpetrator serves to reduce the inclusiveness of Rwandan citizenship in the post-genocide context. A twisted form of modernity besets not only poor Rwandans, but also their leaders who, in attempting to get a ‘correct’ understanding of the genocide, have unwittingly embraced the logic of race. Seeing Rwandan society as unavoidably divided between recognized victims, and others vaguely or more tangibly suspected of crimes of genocide serves to force the mainly Hutu majority into the confessional booth, and the minority onto the cross. Neither position is particularly comfortable.

Opening up citizenship for all Rwandans will require seeing beyond presumptions of guilt and innocence, and making horizontal as well as vertical social relations more inclusive and participatory. What are needed are accounts of the genocide that undermine the pseudo-scientific categories of race that underpinned it in the first place, rather than shoring these categories up, however inadvertently. The ‘... lack of open debate about Rwanda’s painful past’ (Walsh, 2004) means that citizenship is empty of real content. Being a Rwandan implies few if any material benefits for the poorest and most marginalized in society. Those who stayed alive and are Tutsi are called survivors, and most have access to some kind of funding for survivors. The others are not commemorated, and this is bound to have negative implications for their rights as full Rwandan citizens.

Rafti points out that the way the International Criminal Tribunal on Rwanda (ICTR) has operated has tended to perpetuate a false impression that ‘the Tutsi were the only victims of crimes committed in Rwanda’ (Rafti, 2004: 10). When the ICTR was established, the idea was to prosecute all war crimes, including but not limited to crimes of genocide. The legal principle was individual criminal responsibility, rather than collective guilt or innocence. But the ICTR completely failed to bring RPA soldiers to trial, and former chief prosecutor, Carla del Ponte, eventually resigned over non-cooperation by the Rwandan authorities, who blocked all efforts to gather evidence on charges against members of the RPA. Alison des Forges has convincingly argued that impunity is not just a problem for those who are
victims and their relatives; it is a problem for the regime too, because it sows antagonisms and resentments in the present that can grow into possible retaliation and violence in the future (des Forges, 1999; Kiwuwa, 2006; Pottier, 2002: 157–9; Reyntjens, 2004: 204).

The process resembles the projection of Jewish victimhood into the past by the official history commemorated by the Israeli authorities: ‘certification as (vicarious) victims could be claimed’, comments Novick, ‘with all the moral privilege accompanying such certification’ (Novick, 2001: 8). Under the ‘History’ sub-section ‘Genocide’ on the Government of Rwanda website (n.d.), killings of Tutsi in 1959 are presented as the precursor of genocide. This period, called the Rwandan Revolution by some, was in fact a Belgian-backed coup against the monarchy. The new regime depicts this era as the harbinger of genocide, referring to ‘a habit’ of anti-Tutsi killings under the two previous Hutu-dominated regimes. The implication of this is that the political project of both post-independence Rwandan regimes was implicitly genocidal through and through, a highly contentious and divisive position.

The peculiar identity politics of the post-genocide political leadership of Rwanda, represented by the RPF and Kagame himself, can best be understood as a version of what Robin Cohen has termed victim diasporic nationalism (Cohen, 1997). The implicit or explicit assumption is that a social grouping with some identifiable common origins has been victimized continuously over a long period of time. Members of this victim group have been forced into a diaspora, into exile, and have the right to return – in this case to Rwanda – to reclaim their ‘promised land’ denied them by a history of persecution (Cohen, 1997; van der Meeren, 1996). For the RPF, the Tutsi who went into exile in the 1960s following their persecution merit the status of official victims in this version of national Rwandan history. This was clear also from our brief discussion of the official Government of Rwanda website version of Rwandan history. Reconstructed Rwandan nationalism on the basis of this myth of diasporic Tutsi victimhood cannot form the basis for the unifying Rwandan nationalism, the regime claims to be promoting. If the foundation myth for their vision of Rwanda is centred on the genocide experience in this way, and simplifies the whole experience into goodies versus baddies, then it does not open up a more democratic future, or more inclusive ways of constructing citizenship in future.

For Hutu Rwandans, whether the regime intended this or not, identity politics has become tied up with anticipating accusations of bias and genocide denial, and they need to exculpate their guilt even where they do not feel it. Forgetting is simply not an option, and yet some forgetfulness, as Novick argues, is needed for processes of healing and reconciliation, and so that peace and shared civic values can be constructed (Novick, 2001: 164–5). The real complexity of Rwandan history, and the urgent imperatives of overcoming social injustices are lost in the government’s apparently
ceaseless task of commemorating and preventing genocide. Real Rwandans’ lives simply do not fit into the over-simplified choices that the regime offers them today (Lemarchand, 1999).

After the RPF came to power, it emerged that they too had committed their share of war crimes. Many civilians were killed by the RPF, as well as genocidal killing squads disciplining their own, not to mention hunger and disease. Rwandans with mixed backgrounds could lose both their parents; one during the genocide, the other in flight. Tens and perhaps hundreds of thousands of Rwandans’ deaths were caused by RPA military intervention in Eastern Congo and the resulting flight of Rwandan refugees in terror. Many of those who fled in 1994 ‘have never been located’, and have simply disappeared without trace (Human Rights Watch, 1999). This is why the estimates of the numbers killed by the RPA vary enormously. In 1996, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) acknowledged, ‘... many refugees did have genuine concerns about safety and justice in Rwanda’, but yet the same organization declared it was safe for Rwandans to return (Pottier, 2002: 133).

In one of the most widely reported atrocities, the RPA killed at least 2,000–4,000 refugees at Kibeho camp on the Tanzanian border. The camp was destroyed by the RPA in 1996, and the killings took place in full sight of UN troops, who were unable to intervene (Pottier, 2000). The new caseload refugees’ worries were not taken seriously by most of the international community, who bought the official line that those who refused to come back to Rwanda were genocide hardliners. Only a handful of NGOs, such as Médecins Sans Frontières, remained to provide humanitarian assistance to the last desperate columns of fleeing Rwandans as they moved deeper into Zaire, where most gave up the ghost (Williams, 2004).

The official line was that those who fled were terrorized by their own guilt, not by the RPA, and were simply: ‘... unwilling to face the reality of genocide’ (Eltringham, 2004: 109; Pottier, 2002: 133; Williams, 2004: 5). They were accused of being in denial, running away from justice. Their deaths too were presented as self-induced; they were killed because they would not come back peacefully to Rwanda. The significance of Pottier’s phrase, included earlier among scholarly prognoses for Rwanda, is apparent here. As he comments, if this twisted logic persists, ‘Rwanda ... and the Great Lakes region generally, will remain entrapped in an official discourse which legitimates the use of violence and makes some, leaders and led, génocidaires’ (Pottier, 2002: 207). By claiming a virtual monopoly of virtue, the current leadership of Rwanda presents its victims as responsible for their own persecution, mistreatment, disappearance and even death. They are swept out of mind, as backward looking people, hopeless cases who have no eye to the future, no understanding of the past, as the damned (Rafti, 2004: 11).
It thus remains true that: ‘... the immediate challenge in Rwanda is to undercut Hutu and Tutsi as political identities ... this will not happen so long as the minority monopolizes power’ (Mamdani, 2001: 281). This applies whatever the background and socialization of the elite in power. To help discern the potential for new and more inclusive forms of political identity to emerge in Rwanda today, we consider people who find themselves located, or pushed, onto the boundaries of ethnic or and national identity polarizations, between Hutu and Tutsi and between Rwandan and non-Rwandan. These profiles provide a deeper insight into how identity politics operates in Rwanda, and complement the kind of evidence we have considered so far in this article. The individuals’ mixed backgrounds are significant, as will be explained.

PROFILES OF RWANDAN EXILES

The three individuals whose profiles follow sought refuge outside the country for political, and in some ways similar, reasons. For each one, his or her identity as a mixed person complicated their position, since they straddled boundaries of ‘race’ and ‘nationality’, in a way not accommodated by officially recognized categories of political identification. These people’s political identities were reconstructed several times over in post-genocide Rwanda, as will become evident. Their experiences suggest the state of inter-group relationships in the country. Post-genocide Rwandan reconstruction has been a painful process for all three, involving violence, death and loss. At the very least, the choices they have faced have been stark. In each case, the exile’s name has been changed.

Case 1: Noelle Angelicas (female)

Noelle’s father was a prominent official under the former Habyarimana regime, and this automatically made Noelle a suspected génocidaire in present-day rural Rwanda. She is the only known survivor of a family of 10 and the offspring of a mixed Hutu–Tutsi marriage. Her mother was Tutsi and was killed at the start of the genocide of 1994. Noelle inherited her mother’s looks and is taken for a Tutsi. Her father and seven siblings are all presumed dead, and either fled or were killed following attacks by RPA soldiers on their camp in the former Zaire in 1996. Noelle survived for years hidden in the house of a priest in Kivu. After being raped by an RPA soldier in 2001, she gave birth to a son the following year. Heavily pregnant, Noelle moved to Rwanda from former Zaire, and lived there with a relative. This relative was involved in an opposition party, banned the same year for being ‘divisive’ and ‘ethnicist’. Shortly afterwards, he was arrested by RPA.
soldiers and disappeared. Noelle was warned that the soldier who raped her was looking for her. Fearing for her life, she fled Rwanda. Noelle has been trapped between her father’s reputation as a prominent (though not active) official under the previous regime, and her status as a victim of rape by an RPA soldier. She fears she could be silenced as a witness to war crimes in former Zaire, now DRC. In spite of her ‘Tutsi’ appearance, she is clear that she cannot share her mother’s political identity as a genocide victim because of her Hutu father. Noelle was initially refused asylum on the grounds that she had nothing to fear from returning to Rwanda, and that it was unlikely the RPA soldier who had threatened to silence her ‘for good’, would do so. She eventually obtained asylum.

This woman’s Tutsi appearance and the Tutsi identity of her mother did not protect her from persecution after the genocide, neither in former Zaire, nor on return to Rwanda, where she did not feel safe. The political identity affixed to her was of a new caseload returnee – one guilty by association of being active in the political opposition. Rather than disappearing like her relative, Noelle decided to go into exile. Ironically, the journey was paid for by an RPA soldier who warned her she was targeted by her rapist, took pity on her and helped her escape Rwanda.

**Case 2: Julius Gasana (male)**

Julius is the son of a mixed marriage, and like Noelle, his father was Hutu and his mother Tutsi. His mother was killed at the start of the genocide, on 9 April 1994. Julius’s father was killed at the same time for trying to defend his Tutsi wife from being killed. Julius is therefore, by any definition of genocide, a genocide survivor. He remained hidden inside Rwanda until July when the RPF took over, confirming his political identity as someone who lost his family as a direct result of the genocide. However, one of his father’s brothers is to be found on the official list of Category 1 genocide suspects, and was an active killer around Gitarama (not real location). This uncle’s whereabouts are unknown, and he is presumed dead in former Zaire. As the oldest surviving male relative of this uncle suspected of genocide, Julius’s status as victim of genocide is forgotten. Instead, he became a target of Tutsi survivors in his hometown and was attacked and badly injured by his neighbours. When Julius complained to the police, they did nothing to protect him from further attacks, and did not investigate. Since Julius’s uncle was a suspected *genocidaire*, and even though Julius lost both parents to the genocide, and awaited the RPA inside Rwanda in 1994, he inherited his uncle’s reputation as a killer. Unable to claim the status of genocide survivor, Julius is instead blamed for the crimes of his Hutu uncle. Although he fits the image of a typical Tutsi, and is loyal to the RPF, who saved him when they took over the country, Julius is guilty by association with his father’s brother. Unsafe in his home community, he fled Rwanda.
and sought protection overseas. However, his asylum application in the UK was refused. The UK Home Office in the country of asylum claimed not to believe that a Rwandan survivor such as Julius could be persecuted by other survivors simply for being born to the relative of a Category 1 genocide suspect. This was in spite of substantial evidence. He appealed the decision.

Julius’s story shows how misleading terms such as ‘survivor’ and ‘genocide suspect’ can be, and how guilt and innocence are not clear categories when it comes to real people. The genocide cut across Rwandan society and literally cut families in half, sometimes making of an individual such as Julius both a victim and a presumed perpetrator. Although the genocide did divide Rwandan people in ways other than ‘racial’, these non-racial divisions are often overlooked in efforts to bring those accused of crimes of genocide to justice. An interesting element of Julius’s account is the horizontal violence by survivors against the relative of a suspected génocidaire, something relatively rarely reported in the media, in constrast with the killing of survivors.

Case 3: Modus Nzishura (male)

Modus’s father was Rwandan and his mother a Congolese Banyamulenge. In terms of his own identity, he describes himself as both Banyamulenge and Rwandan. Prior to 1999, Banyamulenge were encouraged to return to Rwanda as part of the RPF’s diasporic form of nationalism. However, after 2000, this policy was reversed, and Modus’s father was advised to divorce his mother because she was Congolese. His father refused, and as a result Modus was unable to obtain Rwandan citizenship. Under Congolese law, Modus was not entitled to Congolese citizenship either. Modus’s father, who had consistently campaigned against the war in eastern DRC, was shot dead at point blank range in Kigali by the Rwandan army in 2003. This was the official response to his demand for withdrawal of Rwandan troops from DRC. His body was dumped in the road outside the family home in a residential area of the city. Modus’s mother and sister were later arrested and both disappeared. Modus claims to be of Tutsi appearance, and has lived for many years in Rwanda. He had a Rwandan father, but cannot call himself a Rwandan. He is stateless. In terms of his own political identity, Modus is trapped between a diasporic reality that includes the Banyamulenge, or elements of them, and an increasingly narrow definition of citizenship being employed by the Rwandan government. Claiming asylum, Modus was initially refused, on the grounds that the story he recounted of his father’s killing was not believed. However on appeal, he was allowed to remain for a limited period, mainly because his statelessness made it difficult to decide where to return him to.

Modus’s statelessness results from the rapidly hardening boundaries of national citizenship in the Great Lakes region of today, and the internal
fragmentation of DRC. The Banyamulenge, first courted and then abandoned by the RPF, were defined during the early post-genocide era as part of the diasporic victim Tutsi nation, invited back into the country and offered Rwandan nationality. The loss of nationality for this individual, whether he considered himself to be Rwandan or Banyamulenge, obliged him to subsist for years on the margins of two state systems, unable to claim full citizenship in either. His position resembles in microcosm that of the Banyamulenge writ large; accepted nowhere and subject to contradictory impulses from warring parties. Branded a political opponent in Rwanda because of his father’s outspoken views, Modus’s choice of political identities has been very circumscribed. After members of his family were killed, he went into exile in order to survive.

Each of these three profiles illustrates how tightly people’s political identities can be constrained by the official and informal parameters of recognized political identities, citizenship and nationality; guilt and innocence. Within these parameters, individuals’ identifications are made in the face of strictly limited choices, and even appearance becomes irrelevant. Not identical to the race categories of the past, these individuals’ political identities cut across the available: ‘old caseload’, ‘survivor’ (the first covers anglophone and francophone former exiled Tutsis, the second Rwandan-born Tutsis); ‘new caseload’ or ‘suspected génocidaire’, almost always Hutu. In each case, the mixed background of the individual profiled has exposed them to state violence, violence from militias and even from families and neighbours.

These Rwandans of mixed heritage are of interest as they fall between various post-genocide categories of political identity and their experiences show up some of the fissures not always as visible at the collective level (Mamdani, 2001: 45). At the very least, we have to conclude that the polarized ‘race’ identities of the past are not about to disappear under a consensual notion of shared and inclusive Rwandan citizenship. Each story highlights the complexity and ambiguity of a real-life circumstance, cut across by the simplistic, unitary narrative of genocide promoted and sanctioned by the Rwandan political authorities. Complexity cannot be accommodated into the neatly divided categories of guilt and innocence, the blessed and the damned. Each profile shows that individuals are blamed for the sins of their relatives; all three find themselves – quite typically of mixed people in conflict situations – squeezed between the polarized political identities of their mixed parentage.

Mixed individuals like these Rwandans seem to have even more difficulty establishing their entitlement to full Rwandan citizenship today than they did in the pre-genocide system, where quotas applied and race categories were imposed from above, instead of being banned. If political identities are more complex in Rwanda now than before 1994, Rwandans
should at least be able to overcome the old boundaries of racial identity imposed from colonialism onwards. Shared citizenship and more inclusive and cross-cutting forms of Rwandan national identity should gradually be replacing the exclusive forms citizenship took in the past (Kabeer, 2005). The three cases suggest that new kinds of Rwandan political identities have emerged since the genocide, but that schisms in Rwandan society remain all too familiar. Official accounts of the genocide have ‘frozen’ political identities, reinforcing informal community-level guilt-by-association, like the kind Julius described above. The official myth of the genocide has in effect become the foundation myth of the new Rwanda (Monbiot, 2004).

Rwandans are increasingly identified politically in terms that have nothing to do with their experience, but which have to do with how their (generally male) relatives are officially remembered. The ‘survivor’ category thus mostly excludes those with Tutsi mothers but Hutu fathers, even if they are of ‘Tutsi’ appearance, like the three individuals profiled here. It is as if today in Rwanda only one set of victims can be accommodated, meaning that: ‘Hutu are forbidden any collective mourning’ (Remy, 2004). That someone like Noelle or Julius is not able to claim the status of ‘genocide survivor’ in Rwanda today is telling; it seems a weird inversion of the racial ideology of genocide. Even those with partial Hutu (or non-Rwandan) ancestry can warrant exclusion from full Rwandan citizenship. Perhaps only ‘pure’ Tutsi cannot be accused of crimes of genocide under the gacaca system! In effect, Rwandans with a mixed Hutu–Tutsi background, or those who have suffered at the hands of the RPF, cannot form their own political identities outside the confines of the officially allowed categories. Anecdotal evidence suggests that inter-‘race’ marriages have become less common in Rwanda since the end of the genocide; hardly surprising (Aghion, 2002; Kiwuwa, 2006). Driving the terms Hutu, Tutsi and Twa underground may in the future reinforce the appeal of mobilizing opposition to the government in power along these lines (Zack-Williams, 2003).

During the genocide, some mixed people and some Hutu as well as Tutsi tried to save neighbours and relatives, and to resist taking part in killings. Most were targeted and killed, but some survived to tell the tale. One of the best known is Paul Rusesabagina, former manager of Hotel des Mille Collines, profiled on UK radio (BBC Radio 4, 2002) and hero of a recent Hollywood movie *Hotel Rwanda*. He claims not to be a hero, and considers what he did as quite normal. He kept senior military commander, General Augustin Bizimungu, plied with drinks from the hotel bar, in order to save the lives of refugees inside the hotel. He claims that because of his mixed Hutu–Tutsi background, he felt Rwandan first and foremost. Not loved by the regime in Kigali, Rusesabagina has been in exile for several years. Progressively excluded from the category of genocide ‘survivors’ or victims, Hutu survivors, even those who remained inside Rwanda waiting for the RPA to ‘rescue them’, have been labelled génocidaires or even shot after...
resisting genocide in their locality (Cases 2 and 3 earlier; Lyons and Straus, 2006: 60; Mamdani, 2001: 267).

This section of the article in particular has tried to ‘ease a number of complex voices back into the debate . . . the voices of people that have nuanced stories to tell’ (Pottier, 2002: 202). Post-genocide strivings for justice through community participation depend on goodwill and trust among Rwandans, something the actions of the present government do not always manage to support (Clark, 2005: 21). As always, real life is far more complex than the tidy logic of political ideology can recognize. Not everyone is either a victim or a perpetrator; in reality many people are neither, and some are both, and as the profiles highlighted earlier sought to show, this is something that makes it impossible to talk of the situation in Rwanda today in terms of either the categories of colonial and post-colonial ‘race’ ideology or the categories of the current official understanding of the genocide and the diasporic origins of national renewal.

**CONCLUSION: REINVENTING RWANDAN CITIZENSHIP**

Assessing post-genocide political identities is complex; the benchmark for deciding whether political identities are being redefined in positive ways is not obvious. Modernity is, after all, as much about militarization, civil wars and economic slumps, as about economic progress, improvements in health and social harmony (Abrahamsen, 2003). The Rwandan government’s official version of history has been that the genocide of Tutsi was motivated by race ideas that were colonial in origin. Progress and modernity, RPF style, seem to be about protecting Rwandans from themselves, since their attitudes are irrevocably tainted with colonialism and race ideologies. The government has a point, of course: where racial views are widespread this is not compatible with social peace, but what is worrying is that as the genocide itself moves further away, there is a growing emphasis on its remembrance and categories, as officially defined. This makes for very mixed messages. The government wants reconciliation, yet it constantly draws attention back to the cataclysm that beset Rwandans in 1994, and thus draws attention to those who were killers, contrasting their evil with the innocence of those they killed.

Survivors’ stories today are almost all Tutsi stories, just as Holocaust stories have by definition almost all become Jewish stories. By preserving genocide as the defining moment of Rwandan history, the RPF regime has elevated Tutsi into victims, even those not directly targeted in the genocide. And Hutu, even those who refused to kill, become suspected accomplices at best, and genocidal killers at worst. The RPA become a ‘liberation army’, which ended genocide and offered loyal Rwandans enlightenment and
modernity/progress. The return of the mainly Tutsi diaspora through force of arms thus marks a heroic turning point in the construction of a new Rwanda. Instead, what is needed to promote a spirit of reconciliation is not heroics but a frank recognition that in real life, moral choices are almost never straightforward (Strauss, 2006: 246).

Genocide memorials and remains all over Rwanda honour victims of the genocide, but also serve to constantly remind Rwandans of their painful and traumatizing experiences, perhaps making reconciliation and healing more difficult.

Most Rwandans say that much as they try to put the events of the genocide behind them, they can’t. ‘How can you forget when there are genocide sites everywhere around us?’ (Kamuze, 2003)

Where the central priority is ‘never again’, forgetting the past is not an option. The past is omnipresent, in its officially sanctioned version, its hall of saints and sinners, with the RPF firmly on the side of the angels. Such images undermine the building of public trust across society as well as between rulers and the ruled. The concerns of ordinary and poor Rwandans, especially, are not addressed sufficiently seriously by this government. As people are left to sort out their problems as best they can, in relations with neighbours, former killers and families, the result can be paralysis for those who are depressed and despondent, feel unable to look forward, and cannot overcome their trauma (Clark, 2005: 17). There are some signs of hope; in her films about gacaca, made over several years, Anne Aghion managed to convey the extreme complexity of relationships between former perpetrators and those who can be described as survivors, and what can happen when they start to recreate connections and manage to reach a certain understanding (Aghion, 2002, 2005). Clark says that what most Rwandans hope for, for instance from gacaca, is simple acknowledgement; ‘a chance to talk about their emotional experiences and for the community to acknowledge their pain and suffering’ (Clark, 2005: 20). Ignoring some people’s traumas whilst focusing overly much on the traumas of others, can damage those who receive too much attention and those who feel neglected. A more therapeutic approach would need to be more responsive to expressed needs and needs ‘from below’. Strangling the ability of Rwandans to question their government and its legitimacy will not help.

What really happened during the genocide and civil war period was enormously complex and varied, as recent studies have highlighted (McDoom, 2005; Strauss, 2006). Recognizing this complexity of social relations in Rwanda is vital if social reconciliation and a more inclusive form of citizenship are to be achieved. No sweeping debate on numbers can resolve the ‘race’ issue, which remains a lethal weapon (Hintjens, 2001). The ideology of race needs dismantling from within and undone before modernity can become a bit less twisted in future (Montagu, 1953). As Nigel
Eltringham has remarked ‘seeking and imposing clarity is both the cause of and a response to genocide’ (Eltringham, 2004: xiv). Dividing Rwandans into victims and perpetrators tends to undermine their own best efforts to overcome their past and live together without violence. In trying to reconstruct their own political identities as Rwandans along more inclusive and non-racial lines, Rwandans unfortunately cannot look to the government for positive examples. They can, of course, look to one another; religious inspiration is common among grassroots movements since the genocide, and generally seeks to promote forgiveness and a forward-looking emphasis on what people have in common. There has not been space here to deal with these forms of identity expression, but they merit further attention. Whatever the future holds, it is not this researcher’s role to sit, Cassandra-like, predicting gloom or glory for Rwanda’s people. Rwandans are fully aware of what they are up against, especially those who live with the present regime on a daily basis and have somehow to fit into the tightly twisted social order of the country.

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Notes

1 ‘Race’, which denotes a politics of racial identification, has become more and more a vector for conflict in Burundian as well as Rwandan post-independence history. The term race is used because the ‘Bantu’ and ‘Hamitic’ ideological categories that underlie political identity conflicts along ‘ethnic’ or ‘communal’ lines literally date back to the race theories of the late 19th and early 20th centuries (for an account of this, see Hintjens, 2001). Elsewhere, David Kiwuwa and I have argued that ideas about race, rather than ethnicity, have been used as the dividing line in Rwanda and Burundi (Hintjens and Kiwuwa, 2006). The current danger is not just of ethnic politics, but of a spill-over of racialized ideas about political identity extending throughout the wider Great Lakes region (Hintjens, 2006).

2 The author wishes to thank two anonymous referees for their comments which helped to rework this article. Thanks also to the editors, on whose comments this opening paragraph now draws, for their encouragement to rework and resubmit the article to *Ethnicities*.

3 Over the past few years, as Kagame’s main political opponents have been imprisoned or forced into exile, there have also been numerous disappearances of his...
Rwandan critics. The regime attempts to police exiles as well as opposition at home, including through warnings to family members to keep their unruly relatives in check. The Rwandan government has even requested lists of asylum seekers from western governments, claiming that many are criminals escaping justice (Cruvelier et al., 2004: 195). There is an implied threat against those who refuse to toe the official line, and even against their families. Yet exiles (and foreigners like the author of this article) are the only ones able to state their views relatively openly on what is happening inside Rwanda. All that may restrain them is that their families or contacts may face intimidation ‘on their behalf’.

4 The use of propaganda, of print journalism, radio and ‘event management’ is as much an art in Rwanda today as it ever was, especially as the internet has become a much more important instrument for audiences outside Rwanda, as well as for the opposition to Kagame (Rafti, 2004; Thomson, 1999). There are some parallels between the war on genocidal mentalities and the war on terrorism. The opening quotation from Doom suggests that the political identities people mobilize round make sense in the context of the ‘twisted modernity’ that besets post-colonial societies. But the RPF cannot see things this way, since all ethnic identifications for them are tantamount to divisionism and a genocide mentality. All are considered backward-looking, and ultimately barbaric.

5 On forms of denial by governments, see the exceptionally accessible and thought-provoking study by Stanley Cohen (2002). His classification detailed below has been used in another paper by the author (Hintjens, 2003). Cohen’s article provides a particularly helpful classification of the range of denial strategies used by governments in particular:

- **Silence**: by ignoring accusations completely, the government chooses to remain silent and indifferent in the face of criticism. This was particularly the case prior to the genocide itself.
- **Righteousness**: by invoking a higher moral or religious order, and claiming the right to act in promoting that order, whether that be ‘the revolutionary struggle, ethnic purity, Western civilization’ (Cohen, 2002: 110).
- **Necessity**: arguing that what was done was done in self-defence to avoid greater problems in the future. This was the case prior to 1994 as well.
- **Denial or blaming of victims**: ‘The atrocities of the last few decades show there is no end to the historical spirals of conflicting claims about which group is the original “real” or ultimate victim’ (Cohen, 2002: 111). In 1990–94, viewing Tutsis as eternal outsiders was presented as justification for eliminating them.
- **Uniqueness**: the government claims outsiders cannot understand the situation, or their judgement of the exceptional measures taken would be less harsh. This works more for the post-genocide government and its denial of political repression, human rights abuses and war crimes than for the pre-genocide forms of genocide denial.
- **Advantageous comparisons**: in other words claiming that under similar circumstances your enemies, or others, would have done much worse, and
that by comparison you have shown considerable restraint (Cohen, 2001: 109–12).

These categories permit an interpretation of policies of denial, both prior to and during, as well as after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. For the point about intelligence services and the military, Michael Dorsey, who was an aid worker in Rwanda for two years, has written a chapter that is problematic in many ways – being almost entirely unsourced, and replete with details that make no sense unless one is already extremely familiar with the who’s-who of Rwanda. This chapter is nonetheless one of the few detailed (though as I say, largely unsubstantiated) accounts of the extent of military and political repression in post-genocide Rwanda. Dorsey particularly emphasizes the role of the intelligence services and the youth wing of the RPA (Dorsey, 2000).

6 Interestingly, the parallel between Rwanda’s genocide and the Holocaust is clearly understood by the Israeli government, which has had good relations with Kagame’s Transitional government (Eltringham and van Hoyweghen, 2000: 240). In 2003, Kagame met with Shimon Peres for official talks where, ‘Mr Peres expressed full understanding and support for Rwanda as it works towards ensuring that Genocide does not occur again in that country’ (Government of Rwanda, n.d., 24 January 2003). There are concerns that closer ties with the current US regime leads the Rwandan leaders to think they can continue to intervene in the DRC without any negative consequences. Israel has also provided Rwanda with some bilateral development aid since 1995, and for both regimes the defining basis for national identity is genocide and the return of a victim diaspora (on a fuller treatment of the Holocaust parallel see Eltringham, 2004: Ch. 3; Hintjens, 1999).

7 There is substantial evidence to indicate that appearance, rumour, accusations and even bribery, rather than just one’s official race status on an identity card, could determine whether a person actually lived or died during the genocide (Eltringham, 2004: 26; Taylor, 1999: 72). Frantically seeking clarity amid a complex and messy reality meant genocidal killers swept many people into their nets, including those ‘suspected’ of being Tutsi or collaborators. Some Tutsi survived because their appearance was typically ‘Hutu’ or because they were otherwise able to avoid detection (Eltringham, 2004: 26; Taylor, 1999: 72). Tutsi were rescued and protected by Hutu, some of whom were in command of militias or killing teams and themselves killed other Tutsis.

8 The importance of a rights-based approach is formally recognized by most of the major international donors, including more recently even the World Bank. The importance of economic and social rights alongside civil and political rights is now fully acknowledged by DfID (2003), for instance, and officially by the Rwandan government as well.

9 Rwandans are not all equally ‘at home’ in the new Rwanda; some are forced into exile and many more feel unwanted (Reyntjens, 2004: 194). Rwandans of mixed Hutu-Tutsi background, and relatives of génocidaires may be particularly vulnerable to persecution for their relatives’ misdeeds rather than their own.
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